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Summary 
Key Labour Market Indicators: Oct-Dec 2017 
 Employment 
(16-64) 
Unemployment 
(16+) 
Inactivity 
(16-64) 
Scotland 74.3 4.5 22.1 
England 75.6 4.3 20.9 
Wales 68.7 5.0 23.4 
N. Ireland 72.7 3.9 28.4 
Source: ONS, Labour Force Survey 
 2YHUWKHSDVWFRXSOHRI\HDUV6FRWODQG¶VODERXU
market has performed much better than the 
data for economic growth might suggest. 
Unemployment remains relatively low by 
historical standards and there are 10,000 fewer 
people unemployed in Scotland than this time 
last year.  
Nevertheless, the labour market data released 
last month show something of a fall-back in 
6FRWODQG¶VODERXUPDUNHWSHUIRUPDQFHRYHUWKH
final 3 months of 2017. Employment fell by 
20,000 whilst unemployment rose by 14,000. 
7KHIDOOLQ6FRWODQG¶VHPSOR\PHQWUDWHRYHUWKH
quarter contrasts with the UK as a whole where 
employment rose.  
It is possible that these data represent the first 
indication that weak economic growth in 
Scotland is beginning to feed through to the 
labour market.  
But given the volatility in the Scottish series, it 
is too early to tell whether this increase in 
unemployment is a one-off or the beginning of 
a trend. The data over the coming months will 
tell us more about the direction of travel.  
The big challenge to the Scottish economy 
remains weak productivity. The latest data for 
Scotland released last month provide no sign 
of improvements in productivity growth. 
,Q D UHFHQW EORJ ZH VKRZHG WKDW 6FRWODQG¶V
relatively better productivity performance than 
the UK in recent years ± despite weaker 
economic growth in Scotland ± was the 
consequence of relatively weaker growth in the 
number of jobs and hours worked than the UK 
as a whole.  
With weak economic growth and a relatively 
robust labour market, 6FRWODQG¶V SURGXFWLYLW\
growth is on track to remain relatively sluggish. 
Of course, Scotland is not alone in suffering 
from poor productivity growth. It is a challenge 
facing the UK and many other advanced 
economies.  
Brexit aside, boosting productivity is the single 
most critical economic challenge facing 
policymakers in Scotland and in the UK. 
Without faster productivity growth, wages are 
likely to continue to be squeezed.  
Later in this report, in an article by Stuart 
McIntyre, some of the key metrics on 
productivity growth are reviewed for Scotland, 
as well as some for the UK as a whole. The aim 
LV WR LOOXVWUDWH µZKDWZHNQRZ¶as a means to 
illustrate what we need to know more about.  
A number of underlying causes of productivity 
weakness have been suggested. While some 
of these have been well rehearsed, this article 
provides a brief overview of the key elements 
of these arguments.  
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Overview and Analysis 
 
While headline indicators of ScotODQG¶V labour market remain strong, the latest data 
show a relatively sharp quarterly increase in the unemployment rate from 4% to 4.5%. 
While the unemployment rate remains low by historical standard, this increase may 
be the first indication that the weak output growth experienced over the past couple of 
years is feeding through to labour market outcomes.  
 
 
Table 1: Labour market indicators, Oct-Dec 2017 
 
Employment 
(16-64) 
Unemployment 
(16+) 
Inactivity 
(16-64) 
Scotland 74.3% 4.5% 22.1% 
Quarterly Change 
-0.8 0.5 0.5 
Annual Change 0.6 -0.4 -0.3 
UK 75.2% 4.4% 21.3% 
Quarterly Change 0.2 0.1 -0.3 
Annual Change 0.6 -0.4 -0.3 
Source: ONS, Labour Force Survey (LFS) 
 
Chart 1: Scottish employment & unemployment rate  
 
Source: ONS, LFS  
 
Chart 2: Scottish employment & self-employment  
 
 Source: ONS, LFS 
 
Introduction 
The unemployment rate increased to 4.5% 
from 4% in the final three months of 2017. This 
comes after a sustained period of falling 
unemployment in Scotland. Indeed, despite 
this 0.5%-point increase, the unemployment 
rate has still fallen 0.4%-points over the past 
year. 
This substantial reduction in unemployment 
has taken place against a backdrop of weak 
growth in the Scottish economy. The increase 
in unemployment this quarter may ± in principle 
± be the first signs that recent weak economic 
growth is feeding through to the labour market. 
But it is far too early to tell at this stage.  
Headline employment in Scotland remains 
high, and above its pre-financial crisis rate, with 
74.3% of those 16-64 in employment. This is 
down 0.8% points this quarter but remains up 
0.6% points over the year.  
There are 26,000 more people in employment 
now than two years ago. 23,000 of that 
increase is in self-employment.  
Such growth throws up a number of interesting 
questions around the nature of self-
employment. How much of this growth reflects 
a positive choice by people to set up and 
develop their own business, and how much is 
the consequence of businesses unwilling to 
hire workers directly but contract individuals on 
a self-employment basis?   
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Un
e
m
pl
o
ym
e
nt
 
ra
te
 
(16
+
)
Em
plo
ym
e
nt
 
ra
te
 
(16
-
64
)
Employment rate 16-64 (LHS)
Unemployment rate 16+ (RHS)
240
250
260
270
280
290
300
310
320
330
340
2,100
2,200
2,300
2,400
2,500
2,600
2,700
2007-
08
2008-
09
2009-
10
2010-
11
2011-
12
2012-
13
2013-
14
2014-
15
2015-
16
2016-
17
Se
lf-
e
m
plo
ye
d 
(th
o
us
a
nd
s)
Em
plo
ye
e
s 
(th
o
us
a
nd
s)
Total Employment (LHS)
Employees (LHS)
Self Employed (RHS)
Fraser of Allander Institute & Scottish Centre for Employment Research         Labour Market Trends 
 
 
3 
 
Chart 3: Employment rates by age 
 
 
Source: ONS, LFS 
 
 
Chart 4: Youth (16-24) employment and unemployment 
 
 
Source: ONS, APS   
 
Chart 5: Employment rates by gender 
 
 
 
Source: ONS, APS   
 
 
 
Labour market outcomes by age and 
gender 
As we have highlighted in previous Labour 
Market Trends, outcomes vary considerably 
across different groups.  
Attention typically focusses on those younger 
people engaged in the labour market and the 
extent to which they are unemployed. There 
are a number of reasons for this, not least that 
weak labour market and lack of skills/training 
engagement at an early stage can have 
scarring effects.  
In Scotland, the youth unemployment rate is 
around its historic low. While this is to be 
welcomed, it is worth noting that the youth 
employment rate is still substantially below its 
pre-financial crisis level.  
This is driven by an increase in economic 
inactivity.  
People can be inactive for a range of reasons, 
µgood¶ (e.g. being in education) and µbad¶ (e.g. 
long-term sick). While the published data do 
not enable us to examine the reason why there 
are more 16-24 year olds economically 
inactive, the data for the economy as a whole 
show a substantial increase in those who are 
economically inactive as a result of being 
students. This suggests the rise in inactivity for 
young people is because more are now 
entering education or training.  
One of the other important trends in recent 
years has been improvements in the 
employment rate of women 
The gender gap in employment rates has 
closed from over 10% points in 2007 to just 
over 6% points today. This is driven by 
improvements in the female employment rate 
and the male employment rate still being below 
its 2007/08 level. 
 
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
160
170
180
190
2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17
O
ct
 
20
07
 
-
Se
p 
20
08
 
=
 
10
0 
16-24
25-34
35-49
50-64
65+
5
7
9
11
13
15
17
19
21
23
50
52
54
56
58
60
62
64
2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17
Un
e
m
pl
o
ym
e
nt
 
ra
te
 
Em
plo
ym
e
nt
 
ra
te
16-24 Employment rate (LHS) 16-24 Unemploment rate (RHS)
66
68
70
72
74
76
78
80
82
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Em
pl
o
ym
e
nt
 
ra
te
 
(16
-
64
)
Men Women
Fraser of Allander Institute & Scottish Centre for Employment Research         Labour Market Trends 
 
 
4 
 
Chart 6: Unemployment rate by different parts of the UK 
 
 
Source: ONS, LFS 
 
 
Chart 7: Annual change in unemployment rate across UK 
 
 
Source: ONS, LFS 
 
 
 
Chart 8: Annual change in inactivity rate across UK 
 
 
Source: ONS, LFS 
 
 
 
Differential economic performance across the UK 
is of interest. There have been a range of high 
SURILOH SROLF\ LQLWLDWLYHV VXFK DV WKH µ1RUWKHUQ
3RZHUKRXVH¶ DQG FLW\-region deals, aimed at 
closing the gap in regional economic 
performance.  
Unemployment in almost all regions is now lower 
than it was a decade ago (the exceptions being 
Wales and the South West). The range of 
unemployment rates across regions is now 5.4% 
(West Midlands) ± 3.1% (South East), narrower 
than a decade ago when the range was 6.8% 
(London) ± 3.6% (South West). 
This convergence in unemployment rates is 
clearer when we look at changes over the past 
year. There have been substantial falls in the 
unemployment rate across the North East and 
North West of England, and Northern Ireland, 
with more modest falls in unemployment across 
most other regions. 
At times during the past year Scotland has not 
only outperformed the UK in terms of falling 
unemployment, it has been among those parts of 
the UK with the lowest unemployment rates. The 
latest GDWDKDYHHURGHG6FRWODQG¶VSRVLWLRQLQWKLV
ranking somewhat. 
In a similar way to our discussion of changes in 
youth unemployment, when there is a substantial 
fall in the unemployment rate it is important to 
examine what those who were previously 
unemployed are now doing. Are they in 
employment or are they economically inactive? 
After a period of rising inactivity through 2016, 
VDZ6FRWODQG¶VUDWHRIHFRQRPLFLQDFWLYLW\
decline slightly, with the fall in unemployment 
coinciding with an increase in employment. This 
is not true of all parts of the UK.  
This is particularly obvious in the case of 
Northern Ireland which now has one of the lowest 
unemployment rates but has seen its economic 
inactivity rate increase by over 2% points. 
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Chart 9: Scottish GVA per hour  
 
 
 
Source: ONS, Scottish Government 
 
 
Chart 10: Scottish GVA per hour, 2010-2017 
 
 
Source: ONS, APS   
 
 
Chart 11: Scottish hours worked, GDP and labour 
productivity 
 
 
Source: ONS, APS   
 
 
 
Productivity 
 
The latest figures released last month show 
that labour productivity ± as measured by 
output per hour ± fell by 0.7% during the three 
months Jul-Sep 2017. 
This was 8th quarter in a row of falling 
productivity in Scotland. 
On this measure, productivity in Scotland is 
back at 2010 levels. 
Labour productivity measures how well output 
is fairing relative to changes in how much 
labour is being used to produce that output. If 
we are able to produce more for the same 
number of hours worked then we are more 
productive. On the other hand, if we are 
working harder but not producing much more, 
then our productivity will fall. 
As has been well documented, economic 
growth in Scotland has been weak now for the 
best part of two and a half years. In the 10 
quarters since the start of 2015, Scottish GDP 
has risen by just over 1%. We would normally 
expect growth to be double that in 12 months 
(or 4 quarters). 
Against this however, the Scottish labour 
market has held up much better.  
Chart 11 compares growth in the economy with 
the growth (inverted) in hours worked. 
As an illustration, in Q3 2017, the number of 
hours being worked in the economy increased 
by 0.8%, but this outstripped the growth of 
0.2% in Scottish GDP.  
As a result, productivity fell by 0.7%. 
With such weak productivity growth, it is 
unsurprising that wages have continued to 
remain squeezed.  
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Chart 12: Median real earnings in Scotland and UK CPI 
inflation 
 
Source: ONS, ASHE 
 
 
Chart 13: Consumer price index 
 
 
Source: ONS 
 
 
Chart 14: Consumer confidence in Scotland 
 
Source: GfK 
 
 
 
 
Earnings and consumer confidence 
 
On top of weak productivity growth acting 
as a break on nominal wage growth, 
inflation has remained high.  
UK inflation currently sits at 3%, having 
increased sharply after the EU 
Referendum vote in 2016.  
This is leading to weak real earnings 
growth, eroding the purchasing power of 
SHRSOH¶VSD\SDFNHWV. 
Since the financial crisis, it has only been 
in periods of very low inflation in which 
earnings have grown in real terms.  
This underlines the importance of boosting 
productivity growth in Scotland. If workers 
in Scotland in 2017 are only as productive 
as they were in 2010, it is little surprise that 
earnings growth has been so poor.  
It would appear that, with weak earnings 
growth and fragile economic growth, 
consumers in Scotland are relatively 
downbeat in their assessment of the 
outlook for the economy and their own 
financial situation.  
Weakness in consumer confidence has 
important implications for economic activity 
with consumers potentially holding off on 
larger purchases, perhaps paying off debt 
instead of spending money, and generally 
reducing their levels of expenditure. This in 
turn reduces the level of economic activity 
further. 
Another sign that households are 
struggling financially is the decline 
witnessed in the household saving rate.  
The household saving rate has been lower 
- relative to the same quarter the previous 
year - in each of the last 8 quarters.  This 
suggests that those households which can, 
are dis-saving to maintain consumption 
levels in the face of weak earnings growth 
and higher inflation.
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Labour Market Insights 
,QWKLVTXDUWHU¶VHGLWLRQZHLQFOXGHDQDUWLFOHIURPStuart McIntyre looking at some key 
issues around economic productivity, what do we know and what do we need to know 
more about?  
 
  
Introduction  
 
7KHUHYLHZRIWKHGDWDRQ6FRWODQG¶VODERXUPDUNHWHDUOLHULQWKLVUHSRUWVHUYHVWRLOOXVWUDWH
the importance of improving productivity.  
 
This short article seeks to review in a little more detail the range of data we have on 
SURGXFWLYLW\LQ6FRWODQGZKDWLWWHOOVXVDQGZKDWLWGRHVQ¶WWHOOXV7KHUHLVDODUJHDFDGHPLF
literature on determinants of productivity growth. This article will not be able to review this 
whole literature, but instead will try to give a sense of the key issues and arguments with 
suggestions for further reading for those interested in a more detailed explanation.  
 
What is labour productivity and how is it measured? 
 
Very simply, labour productivity refers to how much output is produced per unit of labour 
(measured in terms of jobs or hours worked). This differentiates it from other measures of 
productivity such as capital productivity (output produced per unit of capital used) or total 
factor productivity (TFP) ZKLFKUHIHUVWRWKHSRUWLRQRIRXWSXWSURGXFHGZKLFKLVQ¶WDWWULEXWDEOH
to labour or capital inputs) which we can think of as the contribution to outpXWRIµSURGXFWLRQ
WHFKQRORJLHV¶. 
 
Labour productivity is usually calculated as gross domestic product divided by the number of 
jobs or number of hours worked. This can be readily calculated and reported and is intended 
to be internationally comparable.  
 
The economics of this are very simple. If we are producing more output per hour worked or 
per job, we are becoming more productive. This in turn should be translated into higher wages 
and greater (in aggregate) economic prosperity.  
 
If we are also becoming more productive relative to our international competitors this means 
that we are improving our competitiveness leading to further improvements in aggregate 
economic prosperity. 
 
What then do we know DERXWWKH8.DQG6FRWODQG¶VODERXUSURGXFWLYLW\SHUIRUPDQFH" 
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What do we know from the data? 
 
Labour productivity growth in Scotland (as well as other parts of the UK) has been poor for 
some time. The chart below shows Scottish labour productivity since 2010, illustrating that 
Scotland is - on this measure - as productive now as it was in 2010. 
 
 
 
While much has been made of Scotland catching up with the UK in labour productivity in 
recent years, as we showed1 the driver of this convergence between the UK and Scotland is 
not a much faster rate of output growth (per capita), but instead the fact that the growth in 
hours and jobs in Scotland has been less than the growth in hours and jobs at the UK level.  
 
Moreover, catching up with the UK is not much of an achievement in itself. UK productivity 
performance has been exceptionally weak too, with the OBR admitting last year that WKH8.¶V
productivity problem is structural.  
 
This is illustrated in the chart below by the slope of the most recent forecast for productivity 
growth becoming flatter than every previous forecast from the OBR and flatter than the pre-
crisis average. 
 
                                                 
1
 https://fraserofallander.org/2017/11/27/unpicking-scotlands-recent-productivity-performance-relative-to-the-
uk-is-it-all-that-it-seems/  
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0XFKRIWKHUHFHQWUHVHDUFKLQWRXQGHUVWDQGLQJWKH8.¶VZHDNSURGXFWLYLW\SHUIRUPDQFHKDV
focussed, rightly, on understanding what is happening at the level of individual firms.  
 
Headline estimates of productivity aggregate over the diverse firms in the economy, and while 
this summary measure can be useful, when tracing the drivers of productivity performance, 
we really need to know what is happening at a micro level. 
 
One simple way to understand the range of firm level productivity performance is to look at 
the distribution of productivity across firms. Helpfully last year the ONS produced a 
distribution of firm level productivity for 2014 by region and by city-region which also included 
some sectoral detail. These distributions for the regions and nations of the UK are shown in 
the charts below.  
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These data show how much of an outlier in labour productivity terms London is. It has a lower 
density of low productivity firms than any other part of the UK and has a higher proportion of 
high productivity firms.  
 
What is also interesting is that labour productivity in many parts of the UK has a rather similar 
distribution. Across all parts of the UK, there is a rather substantial number of low productivity 
ILUPVEXWDOVRDUDWKHUORQJWDLORIKLJKSURGXFWLYLW\RUµIURQWLHU¶ILUPV 
 
This serves to illustrate that while aggregate productivity may be disappointingly low and 
productivity growth disappointingly weak, this masks the distribution of experiences at the 
firm level. It is not all firms that have low levels of productivity, but there is a substantial 
number across all parts of the UK. 
 
Within Scotland, the ONS data also provide a snapshot of the distribution of firm productivity 
LQIRUWKUHHµFLW\-UHJLRQV¶ 
 
This underlines the unique nature of the economy of the North East of Scotland as a result 
of the activities of the Oil & Gas sector. These data also highlight some subtle differences 
between the economies of Glasgow and Edinburgh with Glasgow having a slightly greater 
share of firms in the upper tail of the distribution than Edinburgh. 
 
 
 
 
While these data are valuable as a snapshot, ONS have not produced similar distributions of 
firm productivity for the years before and after to enable us to see how the distribution of firm 
level productivity is changing over time.  
 
For example, it would be useful to know whether the gap between the most productive and 
the least productive firms is widening or closing. It would also be useful to examine the extent 
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to which firms are moving around within this distribution over time, or whether the ranking of 
firms is broadly stable over time.  
 
We also know, thanks to work by the ONS, something about firm level productivity by sector 
in Scotland.  
 
The chart below highlights productivity differences across sectors in the Scottish economy. 
 
 
 
These data show how important the Mining and Utilities sector was to the Scottish economy 
in 2014, underlining how critical the oil price slump has been in explaining recent economic 
experience.  
 
Median productivity in some sectors (such as Accommodation and food services) is much 
lower than in other sectors (such as Information and communications). We can also see that 
in some sectors GVA per worker is rather similar across firms (e.g. Real Estate Activities) but 
much more varied in others (such as Mining and utilities).  
 
Beyond these data, we know little about the distribution of firm level productivity in Scotland. 
In particular, we know little about how firm level productivity has evolved over time. However, 
as a result of work by the Bank of England2, we know that around one in three firms in the 
8.DVDZKROHKDYHQ¶WVHHQWKHLUSURGXFWLYLW\LPSURYHWKLVFHQWXU\ 
 
AWWKHVDPHWLPHWKH%DQNRI(QJODQGVKRZHGWKDWWKHKHDUWRIWKH8.¶VµSURGXFWLYLW\SX]]OH¶
has not been a failure to innovate ± as sometimes suggested ± rather it is a failure to diffuse 
technological innovation across the economy. Simply put, the UK has some highly productive 
ILUPVLQ WKH MDUJRQ µIURQWLHUILUPV¶<HWDW WKHVDPHWLPHDYHUDJHSURGXFWLYLW\JURZWKKDV
                                                 
2
 https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/speech/2017/productivity-
puzzles.pdf?la=en&hash=708C7CFD5E8417000655BA4AA0E0E873D98A18DE  
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been disappointing. This remains one of the main policy issues in this area ± how can we 
encourage greater diffusion in innovation between firms?  
 
In a speech last year Andy Haldane of the Bank of England suggested that frontier firms might 
be paired up with less productive firms to help them improve their productivity. The benefit to 
the frontier firms ± assuming that they are paired with a company that they currently work 
with ± is the opportunity to develop a more effective supply chain.  
 
Another issue in improving firm productivity is whether those firms who are not seeing the 
improvements in productivity being realised by other firms, are aware that they are lagging 
behind? This was identified by the Mayfield Commission who recommended the creation of 
a means (perhaps through an app) to help firms benchmark themselves against others in 
their sector/region to try to raise awareness of lagging productivity.  
 
The Bank of England also examined firm level productivity across regions, industry, exporting 
status, foreign ownership, innovation, size and firm leverage. While not going through all of 
these results, this showed some interesting features.  
 
Firstly, London, the South East and Scotland (in this order) have fewer very unproductive 
firms than other regions. The most productive region (London) is 75% more productive than 
the least productive region (North East).  Information and communication firms and 
professional, scientific and technical firms have fewer unproductive firms, but the Bank of 
England illustrated the differences within sectors are also marked. Meanwhile Wholesale and 
Retail trade firms have a higher share of lower productivity firms. Exporting firms tend to be 
more productive, similarly for foreign owned firms, and medium and large firms. Firms which 
do not innovate and firms which are highly leveraged tend to have lower productivity. 
 
What else do we know? 
 
There has been a large literature on global productivity challenges since the financial crisis.  
 
Economists have proposed a range of explanations from low levels of investment, banks¶ 
willingness to lend to businesses, greater employment among older workers, and labour 
hording by firms. While these may help us understand some of the observed weakens in UK 
productivity, collectively they fall far short of a full explanation.  
 
Two alternative partial explanations have gained some traction in recent years.  
 
Firstly, explanations based on understanding firm level dynamics ± in particular differences 
in management practice ± largely based around the work of Bloom, Van Reenan and 
colleagues. Secondly issues around the measurement of activity in the economy, in particular 
in relation to the measurement of digital activities. There has been recent work in this area 
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by Diane Coyle3. While not reviewing these areas in detail a few points are worth making 
about each of these explanations.  
 
Firstly, the work of Bloom, Van Reenan and colleagues has illustrated that a substantial 
amount of the variation in firm level productivity is the result of differences in management 
practice. By management practice, these authors mean employee monitoring, goal setting 
and the use of incentives4. In essence, this literature is arguing that management practice is 
another form of production technology5.  
 
Using data for Germany, Bloom & Van Reenan6 showed that there is a high correlation 
between evaluation scores of management practice and productivity. Building on this, in more 
recent work they have shown that around a third of this correlation is the result of better 
performing firms being better at recruiting high performing workers implementing better 
management practice (in particular through pay policy). In combination they show that these 
effects drive a substantial portion of the between firm differences in productivity that we 
observe. This makes understanding differences in management practices between high and 
low productivity firms essential. 
 
But there are also important within firm differences in productivity across different plants. In 
another paper7, using data for the USA, it has been shown that there are substantial 
differences in management practice within firms across different manufacturing plants. 
Indeed 40% of the variation in management practices is found to relate plants within the same 
firm. In turn this variation in management practice is found to account for a similar proportion 
of differences in productivity (20%) as research and development activity. Thus, it is not just 
differences in the productivity of leading and lagging firms which needs to be considered, but 
potential differences in practice driving productivity differences across plants within the same 
firm. 
 
Secondly, there is an ongoing debate in the academic literature about the extent to which 
mismeasurement, particularly of digital services, is contributing to the weakness of 
productivity growth. 
 
                                                 
3
 µ'R-it-\RXUVHOIGLJLWDOWKHSURGXFWLRQERXQGDU\DQGWKHSURGXFWLYLW\SX]]OH¶'LDQH&R\OH
https://www.escoe.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/ESCoE-DP-2017-01.pdf  
4
 Bender, S., Bloom, N., Card, D., Van Reenen, J., & Wolter, S. (2018). Management practices, workforce 
selection, and productivity. Journal of Labor Economics, 36(S1), S371-S409., 
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/146154/1/858747510.pdf  
5
 Bloom, N., Sadun, R., & Van Reenen, J. (2016). Management as a Technology? (No. w22327). National 
Bureau of Economic Research. 
6
 Bloom, N., & Van Reenen, J. (2007). Measuring and explaining management practices across firms and 
countries. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(4), 1351-1408. 
7
 Bloom, N., Brynjolfsson, E., Foster, L., Jarmin, R. S., Patnaik, M., Saporta-Eksten, I., & Van Reenen, J. 
(2017). What drives differences in management? (No. w23300). National Bureau of Economic Research. 
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A recent paper8 examined this issue in the UK and found that the current price deflator used 
for telecommunication services was overestimating the price of telecommunication services 
and that in fact the price of telecommunications output could have fallen by between 35-90 
percentage points more than the current deflator suggests. In which case, the real terms 
growth of activity in this sector will have been much faster, and in turn productivity improved 
far more, than originally thought. Measuring productivity in services is exceptionally difficult. 
For example, how do you measure greater productivity in public services? If the justice 
V\VWHPLVORFNLQJXSPRUHSHRSOHLQSULVRQLVWKDWDµEHWWHURXWFRPH¶" 
 
This is a developing literature and much work is being done to better understand the degree 
of mismeasurement in prices and its implications for the measurement of productivity. 
 
There are also a number of academic papers on productivity in Scotland9. Some interesting 
results from this literature include a finding that new plant start-ups and foreign owned plants 
contributed to lower TFP growth over the period 1997-2012.  
 
This result stands in contrast to much of the literature which finds that foreign owned plants 
tend to be more productive (including a paper by the same authors showing that foreign 
owned plants in Great Britain have higher TFP, albeit also finding that foreign ownership was 
the least important determinant of productivity growth10). In other work these authors have 
found that weak TFP growth over the period 2008-ZDVµprimarily a service sector and 
small-plant phenomenon¶11. Overall though, there is a significant amount more work to do to 
understand the firm level determinants of productivity growth in Scotland. 
 
:KDWGRQ¶WZHNQRZ" 
 
As a consequence of research by academics, statistical agencies, central banks and 
governments, we know a lot about productivity measurement and the determinants of 
productivity. But in this section we identify a few key issues which we feel would improve our 
practical understanding of productivity generally, and within Scotland.  
 
Probably the biggest thing that can be done to improve our understanding of firm level 
productivity is to have a research database (using existing data) produced which enables firm 
                                                 
8
 µ$&RPSDULVRQRI$SSURDFKHVWR'HIODWLQJ7HOHFRPV6HUYLFHV2XWSXW¶$EGLUDKPDQ0&R\OH'+H\V5
& Stewart, W. (2017), https://www.escoe.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/ESCoE-DP-2017-04.pdf  
9 µ7KHVRXUFHVRIWKH6FRWODQG±5HVWRIWKH8.SURGXFWLYLW\JDSLPSOLFDWLRQVIRUSROLF\¶5LFKDUG+DUULV	-RKQ
Moffat, Regional Studies Vol. 51, Issue. 9, 2017; Harris, R. and Moffat, J. (2014) 'Lower productivity in Scotland, 
1997-2012: implications post-2016.', Working Paper. Durham University. 
10 µ3ODQW-level determinants of total factor productivity in Great Britain, 1997±¶+DUULV5	0RIIDW-
Journal of Productivity Analysis (2015) 44: 1 
11 Richard Harris, John Moffat; The UK productivity puzzle, 2008±2012: evidence using plant-level estimates 
of total factor productivity, Oxford Economic Papers, Volume 69, Issue 3, 1 July 2017, Pages 529±549 
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performance over time to be tracked and productivity to be examined regularly across the 
characteristics of the firm.  
 
This requires an investment of time and resources by key partners, but this is the bare 
minimum commitment that we should have to analysing productivity challenges seriously in 
Scotland. In addition to enabling us to better understand what is actually happening across 
firms, and to target policy interventions appropriately, it also opens up the opportunity to 
evaluate the impact of existing and candidate interventions to boost productivity. At the 
moment, a range of policies claim to be helping to improve productivity but because we do 
not evaluate these policies (or produce the data to do so) we simply do not know.  
 
Given the important role of productivity in achieving economic goals and priorities, it is simply 
too important not to evaluate whether economic development resources are being well spent.  
 
A recent paper in the academic literature12 provides a template for such an evaluation in the 
context of effort by the Danish government to help Danish companies to improve their export 
performance. Such effort is costly to the Government, and as the study showed, the impact 
of this initiative on Danish GDP operated exclusively through its impact on smaller firms. 
Investing government resources in helping large companies to internationalise did not 
generate a net positive return to the Danish economy. This provides the evidence base to 
divert resources into helping smaller Danish companies to internationalise instead. 
 
In Scotland, it is possible to argue that policy often suffers from an aching attachment to stasis 
and policy development by anecdote. The toolkit exists to be much more robust and thorough 
in our understanding of the impact of government intervention on targeted outcomes. It is 
beyond time for a rethinking of our approach.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 Munch, J., & Schaur, G. (2018). The effect of export promotion on firm-level performance. American 
Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 10(1), 357-87. 
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